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The Power of Innovativeness in Manufacturer-Retailer Relationships 
 
Structured Abstract: 
 
Purpose  
Retailers often challenge manufacturers through aggressive store brand policies and severe 
listing constraints. This study investigates manufacturer innovativeness as a managerial lever 
to shift the power balance between manufacturers and retailers. 
 
Methodology/Approach 
Using data from 277 senior managers of Swiss and German consumer goods manufacturers 
and analysing these data with structural equation modelling, the authors test hypotheses about 
the impact of manufacturer innovativeness on manufacturer-retailer relationship 
characteristics (i.e., retailer dependency, store brand aggressiveness, and listing constraints). 
 
Findings  
The study demonstrates that manufacturer innovativeness enhances retailer dependency, 
which in turn positively affects overall manufacturer performance. This relationship can be 
explained further: by increasing retailer dependency, manufacturers suppress retailers' store 
brand aggressiveness and attenuate retailers' listing constraints. Store brand aggressiveness 
affects overall manufacturer performance through listing constraints. 
 
Research Implications  
Identifying levers such as innovativeness that assist manufacturers in fostering their power 
over retailers provides a new mode for understanding how manufacturers can influence the 
balance of power between manufacturers and retailers. The study provides support for the 
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approach/inhibition theory of power on the inter-organizational level. Organizations with 
increased power are assumed to have approach-related tendencies and act in goal-consistent 
manner, whereas organizations with reduced power are assumed to develop the tendency to 
pursue inhibition-related actions, e.g., attending to threats. Furthermore, this study identifies 
channel relationship characteristics such as retailer dependency as a mediating path between 
manufacturer innovativeness and performance. 
 
Practical Implications  
Managers need to strengthen the firm's innovative capacity to enhance the performance of 
their companies. By developing the capability to develop radical innovations, manufacturers 
are able to enhance their performance not only directly but also indirectly by strengthening 
the manufacturer's position with regard to retailers. This study underscores the relevance of 
innovativeness for strengthening the manufacturer's position in its relationship with retailers 
that even avoids problems with aggressive store brands and constrained listing conditions.  
 
Originality/Value/Contribution 
This study proposes manufacturer innovativeness as a managerial lever to shift the power 
balance between manufacturers and retailers. 
 
Keywords:  
Manufacturer innovativeness, manufacturer-retailer relationship, retailer dependency 
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The Power of Innovativeness in Manufacturer-Retailer Relationships 
 
Introduction 
Today, many retailers often challenge manufacturers (e.g. Corstjens and Corstjens 2000; 
Mysen et al. 2012).  The power of retailers affects overall manufacturer performance for at 
least two reasons. First, retailers exercise their power over a manufacturer by imposing severe 
listing constraints (e.g. Geylani et al. 2007; Gomez and Benito 2008). Listing constraints refer 
to any intentionally imposed obstacle by a retailer to detain or hamper the sale of a 
manufacturer’s products in the retailer’s outlets. This includes amongst other presentation 
fees, slotting, display, pay-to-stay, and failure fees (Bloom et al. 2000), advertising subsidies, 
and other requests for advantages, such as credit terms, delivery terms, and cases of free 
goods like rebate in kind (Marx and Shaffer 2004). Second, retailers exercise their power by 
implementing aggressive store brand policies (e.g. Ailawadi 2001; Collins and Burt 2003). 
Store brands allow for higher margins than manufacturer brands (Ailawadi and Harlam 2004), 
because they can be offered at lower prices due to lower advertising and overhead costs, 
which are absorbed by the retailer’s total budget, while manufacturers often employ large 
budgets to “push” their brand (Morris 1979). This gives retailers more flexibility and space 
for profit. In addition, when a retailer offers similar products as a manufacturer, but under the 
retailer’s own brand name, it is difficult for consumers to make price checks because the 
products do not seem to be identical. This reduces pressure on the retailer’s price and might 
increase profits. Retailers may succeed in positioning their store brands as an equal or even 
better alternative to manufacturer brands (Burt 2000). Hence, both listing constraints and the 
introduction of store brands threat manufacturers’ profit and market share.  
To deal with these challenges, manufacturers seek to re-establish their power position 
in relation to retailers. This study proposes that a manufacturer's innovativeness might be a 
key component of an effective strategy to re-establish bargaining and negotiating power in 
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relation to retailers that eases dependency of manufacturers from retailers. Radically new 
products such as Apple's iPhone and Red Bull have substantial customer appeal and increase 
customer demand. Retailers can hardly afford to cast off such highly innovative products, and 
therefore, the manufacturers of these products are in an advantageous position. In this study, 
the authors examine the impact of manufacturer innovativeness on the power balance in 
manufacturer-retailer relationships by analysing data from manufacturers in Switzerland and 
Germany. The findings show that manufacturer innovativeness contributes to overall 
manufacturer performance by increasing retailer dependency and that the mediating effect of 
retailer dependency mitigates the threats of store brand aggressiveness and listing constraints. 
In this regard, the study contributes to the extant marketing literature in the following ways: 
First, the study contributes to the discussion on channel relationships that focuses on the 
power balance between manufacturers and retailers (Bloom and Perry 2001). Extant research 
on the power balance in distribution channels investigates the power relations among channel 
members and the structural determinants of these relations, such as market and channel 
characteristics that are largely exogenous to the manufacturer (e.g. number and concentration 
of retailers and manufacturers) (e.g. Brown et al. 1983; Collins 2002). Beyond the prospect of 
strengthening a manufacturer's brand (e.g. Glynn et al. 2012), scholars provide virtually no 
guidance as to how a manufacturer can improve its power position towards retailers by 
actively influencing determinants of the manufacturer-retailer relationship. Identifying levers 
such as innovativeness that assist manufacturers in fostering their power over retailers 
provides a new mode for understanding how manufacturers can influence the balance of 
power between manufacturers and retailers. Such understanding can facilitate a 
manufacturer’s ability to negotiate favourable listing conditions and attenuate the retailer’s 
store brand aggressiveness.   
 Second, most of the social psychological theories on power could be situated on an 
intra- and inter-individual, intergroup, and ideological level (Doise 1986; Brauer and Bouhis 
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2006). This study extends the social psychological literature by analyzing the effects of power 
on the inter-organizational level.   
Third, this study advances the literature on the relevance of a firm's innovativeness. 
While previous research has largely provided support for the effect of innovativeness on 
performance-related measures (e.g. Hult et al. 2004; Sorescu and Spanjol 2008), researchers 
have not yet considered channel relationship characteristics as mediating variable. The gap in 
research is surprising given the relevance of channel relationships for manufacturer 
performance (Ailawadi 2001). This study identifies channel relationship characteristics as a 
mediator between manufacturer innovativeness and overall manufacturer performance. In so 
doing, we provide a means of better understanding how innovativeness creates value for 
manufacturers.  
The manuscript’s structure is as follows: The manuscript first establishes the theoretical 
background and a conceptual model. The authors then derive hypotheses for the model, and 
they describe the research methodology of the study and present the results. Next, the authors 
discuss the findings in light of the proposed theory and hypotheses. They outline the 
theoretical contributions of the study and the managerial implications. The manuscript 
concludes with a discussion of research limitations and directions for further research. 
 
Theoretical Background and Conceptual Model 
This research primarily roots in the behavioral-based concept of power in distribution 
channels (Brown et al. 1983; Gaski and Nevin 1985). Power in a distribution channel refers to 
a channel member's control over and ability to alter the behavior of another channel member, 
so that the other channel member takes actions that would not have been taken otherwise (El-
Ansary and Stern 1972). Scholarly conceptualizations of power in channels of distribution 
primarily refer to Emerson's (1962) concept of dependency.  
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Emerson's (1962) concept of dependency, in tradition of Thibaut and Kelley (1959) and 
Kelley and Thibaut (1978), argues that power resides implicitly in a channel member's 
dependency upon another channel member. A retailer's dependency is directly proportional to 
its investment in goals mediated by the manufacturer (e.g. retailer's revenues) and inversely 
proportional to the availability of these goals to the retailer outside the particular retailer-
manufacturer relationship. Put differently, the dependency of a retailer upon a manufacturer is 
reflected in how essential the manufacturer’s goods are in fulfilling a retailer's goals and in 
the difficulty the retailer perceives in switching to alternative sources of supply (Brown et al. 
1983).  
This study applies the terminology of the distribution channel literature (Frazier 1999) 
and refers to dependence structures between channel members to describe and discuss the 
distribution of power between channel members. 
Retailers exercise their power primarily by imposing severe listing constraints (Geylani 
et al. 2007) and pursuing aggressive store brand policies (Ailawadi 2001), both of which have 
significant implications for overall manufacturer performance. Because retailers' have the 
ability to deny manufacturers’ access to the shelves, the threat of delisting and the retailers' 
listing fees critically affect a manufacturer's sales volumes. Store brands can become 
threatening competitors to manufacturer products, inasmuch as they might gain market shares 
at the expense of the manufacturer's brands (Narasimhan and Wilcox 1998). They also 
increase price sensitivity in a product category and thus lower revenues for manufacturers 
(Chintagunta et al. 2002).  
On the basis of the aforementioned considerations, this study develops and tests a model 
that analyses the effects of manufacturer innovativeness on retailer dependency. Retailer 
dependency in turn affects retailers' store brand aggressiveness, listing constraints and overall 
performance. Figure 1 shows the conceptual model that guides the present research. 
Figure 1 here 
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Hypotheses 
Manufacturer Innovativeness and Overall Performance 
Manufacturer innovativeness refers to a manufacturer's “tendency to engage in and support 
new ideas, novelty, experimentation, and creative processes that may result in new products, 
services, or technological processes” (Lumpkin and Dess 1996). This study focuses on radical 
innovation, which aligns with anecdotal evidence of retail practitioners who complain about 
the glut of incrementally new products such as me-too products and demand more creativity 
of manufacturers (Udell and Pettijohn 1991). Radical product innovations involve 
fundamental changes in technology for a company and are new to the company and/or the 
industry. They offer substantial new benefits for customers. In contrast, incremental product 
innovations are refinements and line extensions that are new for the company, but they are not 
new for the market (Chandy and Tellis 1998). Thus, manufacturer innovativeness is 
conceptualized as investment in radically new product innovations and the amount of 
radically new product introductions compared to that of competitors (Covin and Slevin 1989; 
Garcia-Morales et al. 2006). The literature (Hult et al. 2004) largely supports a direct 
relationship between manufacturer innovativeness and overall performance. This relationship 
provides the central path for the model of this study. The following argument will determine 
this relationship by identifying several mediating effects. 
 
Manufacturer Innovativeness and Manufacturer-Retailer Relationship Characteristics 
According to Emerson's concept of dependency, the higher the contribution of 
manufacturer's products to retailer performance, the greater the power base of a manufacturer 
will be with regard to the retailer, which, in turn, increases the retailer's dependency on the 
manufacturer. Radically new products can have a significant impact on market success and 
consequently on retailer performance, because these products have strong customer appeal, 
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increase customer demand, and open new product domains (Danneels 2002; He and Wong 
2004). Manufacturers that introduce radically new products achieve a leading position in a 
market as a first-mover (Urban et al. 1986) and are thereby able to achieve high percentage 
margins. Such radically new products contribute to retailer performance by improving sales 
volumes, sales values, and profit margins (Sriram and Kadiyali 2009) while being difficult for 
retailers to substitute. Therefore, a manufacturer's supply of radically new products can 
increase retailer dependency.  
The dependency between manufacturer and retailer is mutual or relative. Relative 
dependency means that both the manufacturer and the retailer depend mutually on each other, 
but one may depend relatively more on the other (Anderson and Narus 1990), which refers to 
an asymmetrical power relationship (Blois 2010). Following resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, for an overview cf. Hillman et al. 2009) mutual dependencies can 
be numerous on both sides. In new product development (NPD) the relative dependency has 
an even greater positive effect on manufacturer-distributor cooperation than trust, 
commitment, shared value, or communication (Song and Zhao 2004).  
The relative or mutual dependency suggest that manufacturer innovation and retailer 
dependency are correlated, but do not necessarily follow a causal relationship. Innovation 
implies a power-dependence relation where “power resides implicitly in the other’s 
dependency” (Emerson 1962). While the overall dependency may be mutual since power 
always involves at least two parties (Huxham and Beech 2009), it is the manufacturer who has 
the resources to create innovative products. The degree of retailer dependency is related to the 
degree of innovativeness and competition among manufacturers. It is in fact the radicalness of 
the innovation (Hernandez-Espallardo and Molina-Castillo 2012) that increases 
manufacturer’s power. The extant literature identifies innovation to be a successful strategy to 
compete with retailers’ store brands (Verhoef et al. 2000), while store brands flourish in 
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environments with low innovation (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007b). Thus, we assume a causal 
effect of manufacturer power over the retailer, whose dependency will increase: 
H1: The more innovative manufacturer’s products the higher retailer’s dependency. 
Retailers are likely to exercise their power by imposing severe listing constraints and pursuing 
aggressive store brand policies that cause conflict in the manufacturer-retailer relationship 
(Gaski 1984). By increasing retailer dependency and thereby reducing the power of retailers, 
manufacturers can create conditions by which retailers are not only less capable of exercising 
power but also able to avoid conflict-laden actions, establish positive interactions, and 
maintain a stable relationship with retailers. Social power studies provide evidence that 
individuals in a low power positions are motivated to establish smooth and pleasant 
interactions with individuals in high power positions (Copeland 1994). 
H2: The higher the retailer dependency the lower the store brand aggressiveness.  
The same holds for listing constraints which prevent manufacturers from being listed in the 
shelves of the retailer or where listings are granted only against a lump sum.  Bloom et al. 
(2000) found a direct association between retailer market power and slotting fees which is one 
kind of listing constraint: higher market power reduces slotting fees. Thus, the more the 
manufacturer can restrict retailers’ power the less probable are listing constraints. 
H3: The higher the retailer dependency the fewer listing constraints are imposed. 
Store brands and listing constraints are interrelated concepts. Retailers make trade-offs 
between manufacturer and store brand products in considering which assortment of products 
to offer. Retailers who invest heavily in store brands will favour their own products when 
making assortment considerations and increase listing constraints for manufacturer products 
to promote store brand products, for example, by improving the shelf position of their own 
brands at the expense of a manufacturer's brands (Steenkamp and Dekimpe 1997; Kumar and 
Steenkamp 2007a). Store brand aggressiveness therefore increases listing constraints for 
manufacturers. 
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H4: The higher the store brand aggressiveness the more listing constraints are 
imposed. 
Retailer dependency on a manufacturer leads to a less aggressive retailer store brand policy 
with regard to this manufacturer; at the same time, store brand aggressiveness increases listing 
constraints. This relationship provides an alternative path and an additional explanation to the 
direct relationship between retailer dependency and listing constraints as stated in hypothesis 
3. When retailers exert power, they can ask lump sums in order to accept listings with the 
purpose to increase revenues by these extra fees. In these cases, the direct effect of retailers’ 
power (i.e, non-dependency, Emerson 1962) increases the listing constraints directly. 
However, when alternative store brands are considered, more listing constraints are imposed 
because of limited shelf space (Gomez and Rubio 2008). In other words, the negative 
relationship between retailer dependency and listing constraints can be explained by the 
bargaining position (direct path as stated in hypothesis 3) and by the fact that retailer 
dependency determines store brand aggressiveness (as stated in hypothesis 2), which in turn 
affects listing constraints imposed by retailers (as stated in hypothesis 4) (Suarez 2005; 
Amrouche and Zaccour 2006). The resulting mediating path is described in the following 
hypothesis: 
H5: Store brand aggressiveness mediates the relationship between retailer dependency 
and listing constraints, such that retailer dependency reduces store brand 
aggressiveness that increases listing constraints. 
 
Manufacturer-Retailer Relationship Characteristics and Overall Manufacturer Performance 
As a channel member becomes stronger in the market and its market power increases, its 
relative economic return increases as well (Ailawadi et al. 1995). For instance, the largest 
U.S. retailer Wal-Mart has squeezed suppliers financially (Bloom and Perry 2001). Ailawadi, 
Borin, and Farris (1995) found evidence of a relationship between increased power and profit. 
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Further, increasing retailer dependency will positively affect overall manufacturer 
performance. In highly competitive markets like the grocery channel where end users possess 
most of the power, those gains could have been gone in the only direction of the consumers 
(Messinger and Narasimhan 1995). We assume that retailer dependency directly affects 
overall manufacturer performance, because such dependency improves a manufacturer’s 
relationship with customers and gives it an advantage over competitors.  
H6: The higher the retailer dependency the better manufacturer’s performance. 
The positive impact of manufacturer innovativeness on retailer dependency is an indication of 
the direct and well-established relationship between manufacturer innovativeness and 
performance. Manufacturer innovativeness contributes to overall manufacturer performance 
by affecting retailer dependency. According to the social psychology theory increased power 
of A over B (i.e. increased dependency of B, Emerson 1962) is a catalyst to engage in actions 
and to act in a goal-consistent manner (Galinsky et al. 2003). Moreover, people who exert 
power are more concerned with learning about their partners (Copeland 1994). Consequently, 
people with increased power will archive a larger share of the pie in negotiations (Giebels et 
al. 2000; van Kleef et al. 2006). Referring to this theory, retailer dependency can be seen as a 
mechanism that transforms manufacturer innovativeness into overall success of the 
manufacturer by learning about the retailers who distribute the innovations, reducing 
deliberation of the manufacturer, and pursuing innovative actions in a goal-consistent manner. 
Furthermore, retailer dependency ensures stable future revenue inflows because dependent 
retailers serve as reliable and readily accessible launching platforms for future products (van 
Everdingen et al. 2011).  
The mediating effect is partial as innovativeness has a direct effect on performance that can be 
explained by other characteristics beyond retailer dependency such as consumers’ needs for 
new and innovative products. 
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H7: Retailer dependency mediates the effect of manufacturer innovativeness on 
overall manufacturer performance, such that manufacturer innovativeness 
increases retailer dependency, which improves overall manufacturer performance.  
Retailers exercise their power by imposing severe listing constraints in an effort to extract a 
large fraction of channel profits, which in turn affects overall manufacturer performance. 
Listing constraints determine how overall channel margins are allocated between the 
manufacturer and the retailer. If retailers with strong bargaining power impose stricter listing 
conditions, the retailers' share of channel profits increases while the manufacturer's share 
decreases, which determines overall manufacturer performance (Lan et al. 2007). Listing 
constraints relate not only to prices but also to the period in which retailers list a product. The 
less time retailers give, the more likely the diffusion of products is inhibited and the less likely 
manufacturers are able to amortize investments in product development and market 
introduction. In sum, listing constraints have a negative impact on overall manufacturer 
performance. 
H8: Listing constraints reduce overall manufacturer performance. 
The relationship between listing constraints and overall manufacturer performance provides 
another explanation for the direct relationship between retailer dependency and overall 
manufacturer performance. Listing constraints depend on retailer dependency as stated in 
hypothesis 3, which in turn affect overall manufacturer performance. That is, the positive 
relationship between retailer dependency and overall manufacturer performance caused by the 
favourable position of a manufacturer towards customers and over competitors can be further 
explained by fewer listing constraints imposed by retailers on highly innovative 
manufacturers and their products. Power studies in social psychology assume that individuals 
who experienced less power (i.e. dependency, Emerson 1962) have a tendency to inhibit, e.g., 
attending to threats and showing more smooth behavior (Keltner et al. 2003). Thus, this effect 
of inhibition and avoidance can be seen as a catalyst of the positive relationship between 
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retailer dependency and manufacturer performance. With increasing retailer dependency, a 
manufacturer may benefit from less listing fees and from favourable shelf-space allocation 
decisions by retailers, which leads to increased shelf-space availability. Shelf-space 
availability and prominence influences customers' buying decisions in a favourable way, 
yielding better performance outcomes (Martín-Herrán et al. 2006). If shelf-space allocation 
decisions occur at the expense of competitors' shelf-space (Ailawadi et al. 1995), a 
manufacturer's competitive situation improves, which further positively influences customers' 
buying decisions and overall manufacturer performance.  
H9: Listing constraints mediate the relationship between retailer dependency and 
overall manufacturer performance, such that retailer dependency reduces listing 
constraints that reduce overall manufacturer performance. 
Retailers also exercise their power through store brand aggressiveness in an effort to extract a 
large fraction of channel profits, because store brands affect the way profits are split in the 
distribution channel (Draganska et al. 2010). Store brands compete with manufacturer 
products, leading to a battle over market share and to increased price sensitivity in a product 
category (Narasimhan and Wilcox 1998; Chintagunta et al. 2002). Therefore, an aggressive 
store brand policy negatively affects overall manufacturer performance, which can be 
explained by lower prices and margins of manufacturer brands due to competition by store 
brands (Krishnan and Soni 1997). 
 H 10: Store brand aggressiveness reduces overall manufacturer performance. 
The strength of the direct causal effect of store brand aggressiveness on manufacturer 
performance is questionable, because listing constraints provide an additional explanation as 
mediator of this relationship. The store brand will capture revenues from the manufacturer 
brand, and thus, reduce manufacturer revenue and performance (Chung 2008). Severe listing 
constraints may act as a catalyst of this relationship by providing more shelf-space for the 
store brands at the expense of the manufacturer’s innovations and making favourable shelf-
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space allocation decisions with regards to the store brands. This, in turn, reduces the 
manufacturer’s revenues and performance (Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer 2004).  
H 11: Listing constraints mediate the relationship between store brand aggressiveness 
and overall manufacturer performance, such that store brand aggressiveness 
increases listing constraints that reduce overall manufacturer performance.  
Method 
Sample and Data Collection 
We focus on manufacturers in the consumer goods industry in Germany and Switzerland and 
their relationship with retailers. Retailers in both countries have achieved considerable market 
power (Weber and Anders 2007); in 2010, the TOP 5 retailers showed a market share of 71% 
in Switzerland and 61% in Germany. Further, Switzerland and Germany belong to the TOP 3 
countries concerning the market shares of store brands in the fast moving consumer goods 
market. The market share of store brands accounts for 46% in Switzerland and for 34% in 
Germany (MetroGroup 2012). 
This study uses a sample from a commercial mailing list and from published directories 
of the top manufacturing companies operating in the consumer goods industry. Experts were 
initially chosen and interviewed to identify knowledgeable informants in the field, to validate 
the scales, to discuss and verify the conceptual model, and to mitigate the problems of single-
response bias. All postulated relationships seemed plausible to the experts. The interviewed 
experts described the power of the retailers as a barrier they have to deal with. Listing 
constraints and store brand aggressiveness are major threats manufacturers are confronted 
with regarding radical innovations. 
After interviewing CEOs, marketing managers, sales managers, and experts from brand 
manufacturer associations, the authors selected CEOs and senior marketing managers as key 
informants, because they are most knowledgeable about their company's innovativeness, the 
established business conditions and relationship characteristics of retailers, and the company's 
16 
 
overall performance. Because many senior managers from retailers take over jobs in the 
consumer goods industry and vice versa, a high permeability of job change exists at the senior 
management level in the retail and consumer goods industry exists. Day and Malcolm (2012) 
underline this argument. They highlight that “CMOs  ([Chief Marketing Officers]) (…) come 
from a wide experience and educational base.” (p. 40). Thus, CEOs and senior marketing 
managers are considered to be reliable informants in the context of this study. Each company 
in the sample was contacted by telephone in order to locate CEOs or marketing directors at 
the strategic business unit (SBU) level and to identify his or her name and e-mail address. 
In all, 1,100 CEOs and senior marketing managers received e-mails that provided a link 
to the online questionnaire. To encourage participation, we offered summary reports of the 
results to all respondents. After an initial and two follow-up mailings, 277 completed 
questionnaires were returned, which yielded a participation rate of 25%. The results show no 
differences between Swiss respondents (145) and German respondents (123) across all 
variables in this study. Of the key informants responding to the survey, 92% held positions of 
CEO or director of marketing within their respective companies. The data reveal no evidence 
of informant bias due to respondents with different backgrounds (CEOs vs. directors of 
marketing vs. senior executives in market research, purchasing, or business development). 
To examine non-response bias, we checked for differences between the first wave 
respondents (after initial mailing) and the second and third wave respondents (after second 
and third mailing) (Armstrong and Overton 1977). We found no significant differences 
between early and late respondents on the measures used in the study. 
The sample comprises brand manufacturers from different sectors: food and beverages 
(35.7%); textiles, clothes, and footwear (15.5%); cleaning, hygiene, and cosmetics (10.1%); 
office supplies, computer, and telecommunications (6.9%); do-it-yourself and building 
material (5.8%); leisure, sports, and activities (6.5%); electric appliances and lighting (5.1%); 
consumer electronics, audio media, and audio-visual media (3.2%); household goods, 
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glassware, and dishware (2.9%); furnishings (2.5%); personal goods and services (1.8%); and 
others (4.0%). This distribution is consistent with the structure of private demand in the 
different consumer goods areas in Germany and Switzerland (MetroGroup 2012). Concerning 
company size, 32.1% of the companies had less than 50 employees, 33.2% had between 50 
and 249 employees, and 34.7% of the companies had 250 or more employees. 
 
Measures 
This study uses measurement items derived and adapted from validated scales. The scales of 
store brand aggressiveness and listing constraints are developed on the basis of a literature 
review and in-depth interviews with six practitioners with various tenures in the consumer 
goods industry. The authors have pre-tested the resultant questionnaire and have refined the 
questions on the basis of comments from practitioners. The study employs a five-point Likert 
scale for all measures. Table 1 contains a complete list of measures and items. 
Table 1 here 
Manufacturer innovativeness. Two commonly used indicators measure manufacturer 
innovativeness (Spanos and Prastacos 2004). This scale captures the development of expenses 
for research and development of radical new products within the last years and the number of 
radically new products compared to those of competitors. 
Retailer dependency. For measuring the dependency of retailers upon the manufacturer, 
the study uses three items from Collins (2002). Collins (2002) conducted a study of 55 Irish 
food manufacturers regarding the dependency of their retailers. According to Emerson’s 
concept of dependency, the power of a manufacturer over a retailer is equivalent to the 
retailer's dependency upon the manufacturer. Because dependency is the other side of power, 
manufacturers should have the ability to answer the above mentioned questions properly.  
Store brand aggressiveness. Store brand aggressiveness includes the manufacturer's 
assessment of the extent how quickly retailers develop store brands and whether this 
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development is an increasing threat for the distribution of their own products. In particular, 
the scale refers to the degree to which retailers develop store brand alternatives to the 
manufacturer's products and to what degree me-too products follow the introduction of 
promising product innovations.  
Listing constraints. The measure of listing constraints employs three items focusing on 
the perception of the manufacturer regarding the increase of listing fees within the last years, 
the increased shortness of time given by the retailer for keeping the manufacturer's product on 
the shelves, and the expectation of the retailers concerning speed-to-market of new product 
introductions. 
Overall manufacturer performance. A set of scale items drawn from DeSarbo et al. 
(2005) and Hooley et al. (2005) serves as a measure of overall performance. The measure 
employs the marketing managers' evaluation of the achievement of the overall profit goal and 
the return on investment goal as well as of the achievement of these goals compared to the 
main competitors. 
Control variables. Dependency structures are related to power asymmetries that might 
also be explained by the mere size of the manufacturer or retailer, market characteristics (e.g. 
uncertainty, turbulence) or the longevity and maturity of relationships. The size of the 
manufacturer shows considerable variance in the dataset, while the size of the retailers is 
subject to less variation because of only few retailers with high market power. In order to 
control for variations in power asymmetry due to company size, this research includes 
manufacturer size as measured by the natural logarithm of the number of full time employees 
as a control variable. The study defines a series of dummy variables to control for industry 
sectors that typically differ in terms of the degree of innovativeness of new products, the 
degree of competitiveness, and their influence on the suggested relationships. The industry 
dummies are 1. food and beverages; 2. textiles, clothes, and footwear; 3. cleaning, hygiene, 
and cosmetics; 4. office supplies, computer, and telecommunications; 5. do-it-yourself and 
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building material; 6. leisure, sports, and activities; 7. electric appliances and lighting, 8. 
consumer electronics, audio media, and audio-visual media; 9. household goods, glassware, 
and dishware; 10. furnishings; 11. personal goods and services; and 12. others. Items from 
scales by Jaworski and Kohli (1993) are used to control for industry uncertainty and 
turbulence. To control for the longevity and maturity of the relationships between 
manufacturer and their retailers, we use manufacturer’s non-economic satisfaction with their 
retailers, assuming that longevity and maturity of a relationship are strongly related to non-
economic satisfaction. We adapt two items from Yu and Psyarchik’s (2002) scale for 
retailers’ non-economic satisfaction with their manufacturers and add an item considering the 
retailers as a good partner for collaboration.  
To validate the measurements, we conduct exploratory factor analyses. Each of the 21 
items loads significantly on its intended factor. Cronbach's alpha coefficients for the 
constructs range from .65 to .93, indicating adequate internal consistency (Churchill 1979). 
The study assesses construct validity of all items pertaining to each construct through a 
confirmatory factor analysis. The composite reliability coefficients range from .65 to .93 for 
each construct, verifying adequate internal consistency of the measures (Bagozzi and Yi 
1988). A confirmatory factor analysis on all items yields a model that fits the data well 
(χ2=335.23, χ2/df = 1.54, CFI = .95, TLI = .94, RMSEA = .044). All factor loadings are 
statistically significant (p < .001). These results indicate convergent validity of the 
measurement scales. Table 2 provides the correlation matrix of the constructs. In all cases, the 
average variance extracted for each construct is greater than its squared correlation with other 
constructs, exhibiting discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981) Although the average 
variance extracted is below .5 for some constructs, we keep all of the constructs because 
Cronbach’s alpha and the composite reliability is acceptable and the requirement of 
discriminant validity was met. 
Table 2 here  
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Because the data are based on self-reports, procedures to account for problems of 
common method variance are in place. First, as recommended by Feldman and Lynch (1988), 
the model's constructs do not appear in the hypothesized order in the questionnaire, and 
pretests with the target population helped us to counter "self-generated validity". 
Second, following Podsakoff and Organ (1986), we employ Harman's one-factor. 
After entering all items into a single factor analysis, the analysis extracts seven factors with 
Eigenvalues greater than one, accounting for 68% of the variance. Thus, no single factor 
emerges, and no single factor accounts for most of the total variance in the items. 
Third, we use a CFA extension of the correlational marker technique (Lindell and 
Whitney 2001; Williams et al. 2003) since Harman’s test is only a necessary condition to 
preclude common method bias. More recent techniques implement a so-called marker (age, 
place of citizenship etc.) that is assumed to be unrelated to all other variables. If this marker 
loads high on all other variables, the risk of common method bias is high; otherwise, common 
method bias is negligible. Satisfaction with the shop opening hours in the country serves as a 
marker variable in this study, which is theoretically irrelevant to the focal constructs of the 
model. The marker variable applies one item (five-point Likert scale with 1=strongly disagree 
and 5=strongly agree). In order to test for the presence of common method variance, the 
authors compare the change in fit between a model in which the paths from the marker 
variable to the manifest indicators of the substantive variables are constrained to zero to a 
model in which they are estimated freely. The change-in-fit-statistics (Δχ2= 20.01, Δd.f.= 19, 
p > 0.10) indicate that common method bias is not significant. These results indicate that the 
data do not suffer from common method variance.  
 
Analysis and Results 
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The analysis of the hypotheses uses Mplus V.5. The overall fit measures of the structural 
model indicate adequate fit of the model to the data (χ2=351.22, χ2/df = 1.60, CFI = .95, TLI 
= .93, RMSEA = .046). Figure 2 provides the parameter estimates of the direct effects. 
Figure 2 here 
Manufacturer innovativeness has a positive impact on overall manufacturer 
performance (β = .15, t = 2.05). Manufacturer innovativeness enhances retailer dependency (β 
= .19, t = 2.19), supporting hypothesis 1. Retailer dependency has a significant negative 
impact on store brand aggressiveness (β = -.15, t = -2.06), supporting hypothesis 2. The effect 
from retailer dependency to listing constraints is not significant (β = -.12, t = -1.53), rejecting 
hypothesis 3. The results provide support for a positive effect of store brand aggressiveness on 
listing constraints (β = .29, t = 4.08), supporting hypothesis 4. Retailer dependency is 
significantly related to overall manufacturer performance (β = .29, t = 3.62), as suggested by 
hypothesis 6. Whereas the data reveal that listing constraints negatively affect overall 
manufacturer performance (β = -.17, t = -1.97), as suggested by hypothesis 8, we find no 
support for the expected negative effect of store brand aggressiveness on overall manufacturer 
performance (β = .05, t = -.75). Thus, hypothesis 10 is not supported.  
In order to test for mediation effects, the study applies Sobel z-Tests, following the 
recommendations made by Iacobucci et al. (2007). As predicted in hypothesis 5, the results 
confirm a fully suppressor effect of store brand aggressiveness on the relationship between 
retailer dependency and listing constraints (z = -1.74; p < .10), such that retailer dependency 
attenuates store brand aggressiveness that enhances listing constraints. We find partial 
mediation of retailer dependency on the relationship between manufacturer innovativeness 
and overall manufacturer performance (z = 1.81; p < .10), supporting hypothesis 7. The 
mediation through retailer dependency explains 25% of the variance in overall manufacturer 
performance. The findings do not support hypothesis 9, which predicts a mediation effect of 
listing constraints on the relationship between retailer dependency and overall manufacturer 
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performance, since the effect of retailer dependency on listing constraints is not significant. 
Listing constraints fully mediate the relationship between store brand aggressiveness and 
overall manufacturer performance (z = -1.82; p < .10), such that store brand aggressiveness 
increases listing constraints that have a negative impact on overall manufacturer performance. 
The finding supports hypothesis 11.  
The inclusion of the control variables in the model provides robust results for the main 
relationships. Figure 2 shows major effects of the control variables.  
Table 3 depicts an overview of the findings of our analysis. The analysis shows that 
manufacturer innovativeness enhances retailer dependency. Furthermore, our findings 
indicate that retailer dependency is the main mediating factor that contributes to overall 
manufacturer performance. Store brand aggressiveness and listing constraints further 
demonstrate the relationship between retailer dependency and overall manufacturer 
performance. Retailer dependency does not directly affect listing constraints; however, 
retailer dependency mitigates store brand aggressiveness, which, in turn, leads to an 
attenuation of listing constraints. Furthermore, store brand aggressiveness affects overall 
manufacturer performance through listing constraints. 
Table 3 here 
Discussion  
Theoretical Contributions 
The advantageous power position of retailers in many industries challenges manufacturers to 
find ways to shift the power balance between retailers and manufacturers (Ailawadi et al. 
2010). With innovativeness, we propose a concept and a managerial lever that contributes to 
related research in several ways. 
First, the results show that manufacturer innovativeness affects the power balance in 
distribution channels (Ailawadi et al. 2010). Most studies focus on the structural determinants 
of channel members' power position, which are exogenous from a managerial point of view 
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(e.g. Davies et al. 1985; Grant 1987; Dobson and Waterson 1999; Collins 2002) and can be 
hardly influenced by managerial action. Innovativeness is an endogenous variable and a 
managerial lever by which a manufacturer can proactively strengthen the power position. 
Further, retailer dependency reduces store brand aggressiveness, which indirectly affects 
overall manufacturer performance through mitigating listing constraints. Research on channel 
relationships identifies listing constraints and store brand activities as drivers of channel profit 
distribution among channel partners that favour retailers over manufacturers and drive retailer 
margins. 
Second, we analyze power and dependency respectively on the inter-organizational 
level. Our study indicates that retailer dependency and thus manufacturer power can be seen 
as a mechanism which transforms manufacturer innovativeness into overall success by 
reducing manufacturer’s deliberation and pursuing innovative actions in a goal-consistent 
manner. Furthermore, the study shows that the more reduced power and the more dependent 
retailers are respectively, the more they show a tendency to inhibit, e.g., less aggressive store 
brand policies. These findings are in line with the approach/inhibition theory of power 
(Keltner et al. 2003). According to this theory people with increased power should be 
associated with increased rewards and approach-related tendencies, whereas individuals with 
reduced power are assumed to develop the tendency to pursue inhibition-related actions, e.g., 
attending to threats. The results of our study provide support for this theory on the inter-
organizational level. Most of the social psychological theories on power could be situated on 
an intra- and inter-individual, intergroup, and ideological level (Doise 1986; Brauer and 
Bouhis 2006). Thus, our study extends the social psychological literature by analyzing the 
effects of power on the inter-organizational level.    
Third, this study advances the extant literature on innovativeness. Practitioners and 
scholars believe that innovativeness is crucial for gaining competitive advantage (Hurley und 
Hult 1998). Though the extant research scrutinizes innovativeness from different angles (e.g. 
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Calantone et al. 2002; Hult et al. 2004), the effects of innovativeness on relationships with 
key market players remain largely unexplored. On the basis of the results of their 2007 meta-
analysis on innovativeness effects, Szymanski and colleagues have asked for more rather than 
less complicated models of innovativeness and to identify and include potentially relevant 
mediators of the innovativeness-performance relationship, such as specific marketplace 
factors (Szymanski et al. 2007). This study addresses this gap in research and is the first to 
analyse the impact of manufacturer innovativeness on the manufacturer’s relationship with 
key market players, i.e., a manufacturer’s relationship with its retailers. The results show that 
retailer dependency mediates the effect of innovativeness on performance. Our findings, 
therefore, contribute to the literature by providing a new mechanism and an explanation by 
which innovativeness affects performance. 
 
Managerial Implications 
The results of this study provide the following recommendations to managers. Obviously, 
managers need to strengthen the firm's innovative capacity to enhance the performance of 
their companies. By developing the capability to develop radical innovations, manufacturers 
are able to enhance their performance not only directly but also indirectly by strengthening 
the manufacturer's position with regard to retailers. This study underscores the relevance of 
innovativeness for strengthening the manufacturer's position in its relationship with retailers 
that even avoids problems with aggressive store brands and constrained listing conditions. 
The development of radically new products is an important means of increasing retailer 
dependency. 
We do not imply that innovation should become a factor of power for manufacturers against 
the retail channel. We believe that quite the reverse could be established and recommend 
manufacturers to take measures regarding how both manufacturers and retailers can benefit 
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from high innovativeness on the manufacturer side and that do not disadvantage neither the 
manufacturer nor the retailer.  
 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This study has some limitations that, at the same time, opens promising directions for 
further research. Although the study controls for common method bias, future research can 
improve the survey method by adding data from retailers that capture their perception of the 
manufacturer's radical innovation activities as well as the manufacturer-retailer relationship. 
Potential single informant bias might be mitigated by the fact that the informants were well 
qualified to report on the variables in the study. Additional data from different informants 
(manufacturer, retailer, and end consumers) would contribute to the validity of the results. 
Although our model took control variables with regard to manufacturer size, industry sectors 
and dynamics, and satisfaction with the relationship into account, some caution is advisable in 
generalizing the study’s results. Future studies with regard to manufacturer-retailer 
relationships should also control for firm age, the presence of the manufacturer in the 
marketplace, and retailer size in relation to manufacturer size. With regard to the convergent 
reliability of the measurements, the measurement retailer dependency shows an average 
variance extracted value below the recommended threshold of .5. Further research may 
consider an improvement or an alternative measurement of this construct. 
Although our sample is consistent with the structure of private demand in the different 
consumer goods areas in Germany and Switzerland (MetroGroup 2012), it is skewed towards 
large firms. Thus, the sample is not representative of the consumer goods industry in 
Switzerland and Germany as a whole, Furthermore, future research is encouraged to examine 
the effect of manufacturer innovativeness on other characteristics of the manufacturer-retailer 
relationship such as trust and commitment. The authors also suggest the identification of 
additional mediating factors related to power and dependency structures among market 
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players in other relational business settings. To illustrate, in an organizational buying context 
for industrial goods, innovativeness may influence critical power-related relationship 
characteristics, such as buyers' idiosyncratic investments in a supplier (Bensaou and Anderson 
1999), which, in turn, can affect the overall performance of suppliers. 
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Table 1 
Construct measurement 
 
Construct Mean
Standard
Deviation SFL t-value
Cronbach's
Alpha
Factor 
reliability
Manufacturer innovativeness 3.68 0.91 0.72^ 0.72
Compared to our competitors we develop many radically new products.* 3.61 1.05 0.71 7.84
The expenses for Research & Development relating to radically new products 
have increased within the last years.*
3.75 1.01 0.82 8.70
Retailer dependency 2.66 0.92 0.68 0.69
If we discontinued supplying to the retailers, they would have difficulty making 
up the sales volume in our product category.*
2.91 1.27 0.67 9.91
If we were to stop doing business with the retailers, they would find it hard to 
source products quickly with similar customer appeal.*
2.86 1.22 0.64 9.26
If our product is out of stock, their customers are unlikely to purchase a 
substitute.*
2.25 1.02 0.63 9.84
Store brand aggressiveness 3.21 0.93 0.85 0.85
Our retailers quickly develop their store brand.* 3.25 1.11 0.68 13.10
Store brands are an increasing threat on our products.* 3.21 1.10 0.75 15.46
Promising product innovations are quickly followed by me-too products of 
retailers.*
3.37 1.05 0.86 17.99
Our retailers have an store brand alternative for almost all products.* 3.01 1.22 0.76 16.63
Listing constraints 3.94 0.73 0.70 0.74
Our retailers expect new products to establish on the market more
quickly.*
4.03 0.77 0.70 9.50
A product is given less and less time to prevail in the shelves.* 4.09 0.84 0.85 13.76
The listing fees have increased within the last years.* 3.71 1.13 0.52 8.88
Manufacturer overall performance 3.46 0.76 0.88 0.88
Overall profit compared to the main competitor** 3.40 0.80 0.74 13.55
Return on Investment compared to the main competitor** 3.41 0.80 0.81 16.40
Overall profit goal*** 3.54 1.02 0.77 15.96
Return on Investment goal*** 3.47 0.89 0.90 19.03
Control Variables
Manufacturer Firm Size 4.84 1.81
Number of full-time employee (ln) 961.73 5498.12 1.00 24.18
Industry uncertainty and turbulence 2.66 0.56 0.65 0.65
In our industry, customers' preferences change quite a bit over time. 3.10 1.07 0.56 8.70
In our industry, consumers tend to look for new products all the time. 3.49 1.04 0.69 9.85
In our industry, new products and services enter the market faster and faster. 3.84 0.95 0.60 9.39
Manufacturer non-economic satisfaction with retailers 3.35 0.76 0.93 0.93
In general, we are happy with our business relationships with the retailers. 3.60 0.85 0.89 18.12
In general, we consider our retailers to be good co-operation partners for us. 3.51 0.88 0.93 21.52
The relationships between the retailers and us are very positive. 3.62 0.89 0.88 18.68
Industry
1. food and beverages 0.36 0.48
2. textiles, clothes, and footwear 0.16 0.36
3. cleaning, hygiene, and cosmetics, 0.06 0.23
4. office supplies, computer, and telecommunications 0.07 0.25
5. do-it-yourself and building material 0.03 0.16
6. leisure, sports, and activities 0.06 0.25
7. electric appliances and lighting 0.10 0.30
8. consumer electronics, audio media, and audio-visual media 0.02 0.13
9. household goods, glassware, and dishware 0.03 0.18
10. furnishings 0.05 0.22
11. personal goods and services 0.03 0.17
12. others 0.04 0.20
*five-point scale: 1='strongly disagree'; 5='strongly agree'
**five-point scale: 1='much worse'; 5='much better'
***five-point scale: 1='not at all achieved'; 5='fully achieved'
p^earson correlation
SFL= standardized factor loading 
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Table 2 
Correlation matrix 
Constructs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
(1) Manufacturer innovativeness 0.57
(2) Retailer dependency 0.20 0.42
(3) Store brand aggressiveness -0.09 -0.14 0.59
(4) Listing constraints -0.01 -0.11 0.35 0.50
(5) Manufacturer overall performance 0.24 0.36 -0.10 -0.21 0.66
(6) Manufacturer firm size 0.01 0.13 0.14 -0.03 0.10
(7) Industry uncertainty and turbulence 0.17 0.11 -0.01 0.41 -0.01 -0.03 0.38
(8)
Manufacturer non-economic
satisfaction with retailers 0.18 0.10 -0.24 -0.05 0.28 -0.21 0.14 0.81
(9) Industry sector 1 (food and beverages) -0.18 0.03 0.27 0.30 0.11 0.12 0.01 -0.30
(10) Industry sector 2 -0.09 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.22 -0.03 -0.21 0.32
(11) Industry sector 3 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.11 0.03 0.05 -0.17 0.02 -0.19 -0.11
(12) Industry sector 4 -0.09 -0.07 -0.17 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 0.07 -0.20 -12 -0.67
(13) Industry sector 5 -0.02 -0.19 0.03 -0.14 0.07 -0.06 -0.09 0.01 -0.12 -0.07 -0.40 -0.04
(14) Industry sector 6 0.17 0.12 -0.013 0.02 -0.08 -0.11 0.09 0.01 -0.20 -0.11 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04
(15) Industry sector 7 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.15 0.27 0.12 0.05 -0.25 -0.14 -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 -0.09
(16) Industry sector 8 0.01 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.12 -0.01 0.1 0.04 -0.10 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05
(17) Industry sector 9 0.08 0.05 -0.18 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.24 -0.05 -0.14 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03
(18) Industry sector 10 0.01 -0.07 -0.12 -0.16 -0.04 -0.01 -0.14 0.15 -0.17 -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04
(19) Industry sector 11 0.10 0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.07 -0.01 -0.10 0.05 -0.13 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
(20) Industry sector 12 0.14 -0.04 -0.14 -0.16 0.05 -0.05 -0.17 -0.03 -0.15 -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04
Diagonal elements in bold are average variances extracted for the constructs  
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Figure 1 
Conceptual model 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Empirical model 
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Practitioner’s summary 
Manufacturers are frequently confronted with retailers who exercise their power by pursuing 
aggressive store brand policies and imposing severe listing constraints. In this article, we 
investigate manufacturer innovativeness as a managerial lever to shift the power balance 
between manufacturers and retailers. 
The study findings contribute to the literature on channel relationships. With innovativeness, 
we introduce a managerial lever by which a manufacturer can proactively strengthen its power 
position towards retailers. The findings further contribute to research on innovativeness by 
showing that specific characteristics of the manufacturer-retailer relationship serve as factors 
that mediate the effects of innovativeness on performance. 
From a managerial viewpoint, obviously, managers need to strengthen the firm's innovative 
capacity to enhance the performance of their companies. By developing the capability to 
develop radical innovations, manufacturers are not only able to enhance their performance 
directly, but also indirectly by strengthening the manufacturer's position towards retailers. Our 
study underscores the relevance of innovativeness for strengthening the manufacturer's 
position in the relationship with retailers that even avoids problems with aggressive store 
brands and listing constraints. The development of radically new products is an important 
mean to increase retailer dependency. 
We do not imply that innovation should become a factor of power for manufacturers against 
the retail channel. We believe that quite the reverse could be established and recommend 
manufacturers to take measures regarding how both manufacturers and retailers can benefit 
from high innovativeness on the manufacturer side and that do not disadvantage neither the 
manufacturer nor the retailer.  
 
